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This paper proposes the question whether or not traveling expenses to work should be
deductible from the income tax base. In order to answer this question, a simple model of
(im-) perfect household and worker mobility is employed. The focus of the analysis is on
the efficient use of land and the efficient allocation of people and labor in a multi-region
framework. The paper shows that deductibility is inefficient only if households are per-
fectly mobile and if households cannot choose their place of work. If the region of work
is not exogenously fixed, traveling expenses to work should be deductible at more than
one hundred percent, even if households choose simultaneously the place of work and
the region of residence, and even if tax rates are not standardized within the federation.
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Mobility and Reliefs for Traveling Expenses to Work
I.  Introduction
The treatment of traveling expenses to work by the tax laws is not internationally stan-
dardized, not even within the group of industrialized countries. Traveling expenses to
work are not deductible in many countries such as the United States, the United King-
dom and even several continental European countries, but they are deductible in other
countries such as the Scandinavian countries and Germany [see OECD (1993), p. 37].
These differences raise the question of whether or not from an economic point of view
traveling expenses to work should be deductible from the income tax base. Although
there is some discussion in accounting and tax law journals, the question is, with just a
few exceptions, widely ignored in the theoretical economics literature.
Reliefs for traveling expenses to work are grounded on equity and efficiency con-
siderations. From the ability-to-pay principle associated with horizontal and vertical
equity
1 follows the principle that pure work-related expenses should be excluded from
the tax base since income that is used to pay for work-related expenses does not increase
the taxpayer’s ability to contribute to the cost of government. However, since horizontal
and vertical equity and the ability-to-pay principle are somewhat vague concepts, which
are, in addition, not perfectly in line with the optimum taxation theory, this paper utilizes
a traditional optimization approach and focuses, therefore, mainly on efficiency and
ignores the ability-to-pay-principle argument.
2
The main efficiency argument in favor of a relief is that income tax should not
distort worker’ decisions concerning their place of work. Critics, however, argue that
rather than the place of work, the location of residence matters and that preferential
treatment of far-off domiciles by the tax code not only reduces tax revenue but is also
inefficient. There is a long debate as to whether the choice of the place of work or the
                                               
1  See Musgrave and Musgrave (1989), p. 198.
2  A more careful analysis of the equity argument regarding work-related expenses can be found by
Baldry (1998).- 2 -
choice of the location of residence is causal for commuting and how the tax code should
be adjusted to that phenomenon. Many authors support the US government’s policy
which has always taken the view that commuting expenses are personal expenses and,
hence, should not be deductible at all [see Due (1977)].
This paper attempts to clarify the relationship between mobility and deductibility
of traveling expenses to work from the perspective of the allocation branch of govern-
ment. Therefore, a simple model of (im-) perfect household and worker mobility is em-
ployed, which borrows heavily from the public finance literature on decentralization and
household mobility. The focus of the analysis is on the efficient use of land and, particu-
larly, on the efficient allocation of people and labor in a multi-region framework. Not
surprisingly, the tax code affects the allocation of labor and residents. Although the
impacts of deductibility of traveling expenses to work on the allocation of labor and
residents will be discussed separately after the introduction of the model, the main inter-
est of the paper is to discuss the deductibility of traveling expenses in the simultaneous
presence of labor and household mobility. If individuals decide simultaneously on the
place of work and on the location of residence, the treatment of traveling expenses by the
tax code might distort both decisions.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. Section two presents the
basic model which is, for the sake of simplicity, just a two-region model. While section
three focuses on pure household mobility, section four only discusses worker mobility.
Section five analyzes the more general case of simultaneous household and worker mo-
bility. Since the analysis reveals a difference between the set of efficient allocations and
the set of equilibria in a decentralized economy, section six introduces tax-rate differ-
ences between regions to overcome that shortcoming. Finally, section seven concludes.
II.  The model
The federation consists of two regions, indexed i d f = , . The size of national population
is denoted by N. People can live and work in either region. A subscript will be used to
indicate the region of residence, a superscript to indicate the region of work.  Ni
j is the- 3 -
(non-negative) number of individuals who live in region i and work in region j. Since all
households must reside at some location, we have
(1) N N i
j
j d f i d f = = ￿ ￿ =
, ,
.
Individuals living in region i and working in region j derive utility from consump-
tion of a private good Ci
j, from leisure  Fi
j, and from housing  Hi
j (measured in units of





j , ,  is well behaved. Individuals are either
homogeneous or they are only heterogeneous with respect to their attachment to home.
In the latter case, they also derive utility from the region of residence. Therefore, we
assume a continuum of individuals, where each is characterized by the type n. Individuals
are equally distributed with density one on the interval [ ] 0,N . The preferences of a type-
n individual are given by
3
(2) ( ) U a N n + - , if he lives in region d,
U an + , if he lives in region f.
The parameter a, with  a ‡ 0, measures the imperfection of household mobility. If a
equals zero, households are perfectly mobile. Otherwise, their is attachment to home, and
individuals are, therefore, not perfectly mobile.
Individuals who do not work in their region of residence, i.e., commuters, con-
sume X units of the private good and need T time units for commuting purposes. Each
individual is endowed with  F units of time. Working time is exogenously fixed at L.
Hence, leisure is given by
(3)
F F F L










= = - -
,
,
respectively. Note that leisure time of commuters is less than leisure time of non-
commuters.
                                               
3  This approach has been previously used, among others, by De Palma and Papageorgiou (1988) and
Mansoorian and Myers (1993).- 4 -
Each region is endowed with land  Bi. Land can be either used for production or
housing. Land which is used in the production process is denoted by  B
i. The land con-
straints are, therefore,
(4)
N H N H B B
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In region i production takes place according to a linearly-homogenous concave
production function  ( ) f B L
i i i , . Either output can be used for private consumption and
traveling purposes or output can be transformed into a public good of which quantity G
is exogenously fixed. The marginal rate of transformation between the private and the
public good is constant and normalized at unity. Hence, the national feasibility constraint
is given by
4















f d d d f f f + + + + + + = + , , .
The individual’s decision can be seen as a three-stage process. Individuals make a
decision upon the region of residence at the first stage and choose the region of work at
the second stage. Finally, they decide on consumption and housing. The commuting
equilibrium at the second stage is characterized by















f , , , , - = 0 and















f , , , , - = 0.
                                               
4  Thus, it is assumed that output can be transported without additional costs, e.g., because there are
negligible in comparison with commuting costs. Although it is possible to incorporate transport costs
into the model, the costs in terms of complexity outweigh the benefits.- 5 -
If some residents decide to commute and others do not, i.e., if, e.g.,  Nd
d > 0 and
Nd
f > 0, they derive the same (sub-) utility from consumption, leisure and housing.
Note that corner solutions are also possible. If (sub-) utilities for commuters and
non-commuters were not equalized, the residents of the respective region would either
abstain from commuting or would not work in the home region.
5











f =  is the maximum utility a resident of re-
gion i can achieve. A migration equilibrium requires
(8) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) $ $ U a N n U an n N n d d f d d d + - - + - = 0,
where  nd  is the marginal individual who is (at interior solutions) indifferent between
regions d and f. All individuals with a type less than nd  live in region d, the other people
in region f. Since  nd  is also the number of region d’s inhabitants, the migration equilib-
rium condition can be also written as















f + + - + + + + = 0.
Since it would be extremely inefficient, if people neither work nor live in a particular










d  will be assumed in the entire
analysis.
To make explicit comparisons in some particular cases possible, it is assumed that
utility is weakly separable between, on the one hand, leisure and, on the other hand,
consumption and housing:











j , , , , = Y F .
Furthermore, the private good and housing are normal goods. Hence, if some residents
of a particular region commute and others do not, and if the marginal rates of substitu-
tion between consumption and housing are equalized across them, then this will only
                                               
5  Corner solutions could be described by additional inequalities. However, to save space these ine-
qualities will be suppressed.- 6 -
constitute an equilibrium if commuters who enjoy less leisure can consume more private
goods and have, in addition, bigger houses.
Consider next competitive markets where p is the nationwide price of the private
good,  wi  and qi  are the wage rate and the price of land in region i respectively. Profit
maximization in this region implies
(11) pf q B
i
i =    and   pf w L
i
i = .
Because of the constant returns to scale, firms earn no profits. Identical endowments of
households with the federation’s immobile resources lead to identical rent incomes
(12) ( ) R q B q B N d d f f = + .
Suppose further that a wage tax is levied at rate t,  t > 0. The budget constraint
of a non-commuting resident of region i reads











i i = + -
- 1 t
.
Neglecting the parameter of attachment to home
6, the utility maximization problem of
this individual can be written as
(14) ( ) ( )
Max U C F H U






































The marginal rate of substitution between housing and consumption is equal to
the relative price of land and consumption.
                                               
6  Since the degree of attachment to home is irrelevant with respect to this decision, it can be sup-
pressed.- 7 -
Traveling expenses of commuters are  pX , but a fraction b of the traveling ex-
penses is deductible from the tax base of the labor income tax such that the government
effectively subsidizes traveling expenses at a rate
7
(16) q bt = .
Hence, commuters who live in region i and work in region j face the budget constraint
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Finally, the budget constraint of the federal government that provides the public good G
can be written as











d + + + - + = .
III.  Household mobility
Suppose first that production is restricted to only one region. W.l.o.g. production takes
place solely in region d. Hence,  N N d
f
f
f ” ” 0 and  B L
f f ” ” 0. Households decide on
the region of residence, but their is no choice concerning the region of work.
Efficient allocations are solutions of 
8
                                               
7  It is assumed that q <1.
8  See, e.g., Wellisch (1994).- 8 -
(21) ( ) ( ) ( ) Max U C F H U C F H
C H C H
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f ” ” 0, B L
f f ” ” 0.
df
d  is the weight of commuting residents of region f in the social welfare function, where
0 1 £ £ df
d . The constraints are the feasibility constraints concerning people (1), land (4),
labor (5), and output (6), the definition of leisure (3), and the migration equilibrium
condition (9).













In that region where production actually takes place, the marginal rate of substitution
between housing and consumption should be equal to its opportunity costs, i.e., the
marginal product of land in the production process.
Furthermore, taking into account all feasible values of df
d , one obtains














































￿ ‡ - .
The marginal net costs of mobile households in terms of the private good in the various
regions should not differ too much from each other. If there were no attachment to
home, i.e., if a = 0, marginal net costs should be equalized across regions. Conditions like
these are well known from the public finance literature on household mobility [see, e.g.,
Mansoorian and Myers (1993), Wellisch (1995), Wrede (1997)].
In a decentralized economy, profit maximization and utility maximization in
















The use of land is therefore efficient.- 9 -
Using the first-order conditions of households, it follows from the budget con-
































￿ = q .
Thus, the following proposition can be stated:
Proposition 1: If all people work in one and the same region, an efficient migration
equilibrium requires















‡ ‡ - q .
Hence, the subsidy rate is constrained from above and below. As a means of re-
distribution, the subsidy rate can be positive or negative.
From the proposition, the following corollary follows immediately.
Corollary: If all people work in one and the same region and if individuals are perfectly
mobile, an efficient migration equilibrium requires a zero subsidy rate.
If households were perfectly mobile, i.e., if a = 0, traveling expenses should not
be deductible from the tax base: q b = = 0 would be optimal. The choice of the region of
residence should not be distorted by deductible traveling expenses. If traveling expenses
were deductible, the marginal net costs of mobile households would not be equalized
across regions. The higher costs of commuters would be understated at the migration
equilibrium.
Notice that incorporation of land in the model is essential here. Only if the price
of land in region f were lower than the price of land in region d would there be incentives
for individuals to live in region f and to commute, in particular, if traveling expenses
were not deductible from the tax base.- 10 -
IV.  Worker mobility
Suppose now that housing is restricted to only one region. W.l.o.g. all people live in
region f. Hence,  N N d
f
d
d ” ” 0. Households choose the region of work, but their is no
choice concerning the region of residence. Whether individuals are attached to home or
not is negligible since households are crowded together in one and the same region.
Efficient allocations are solutions of
(27) ( ) Max U C F H
C H C H
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s.t. (1), (3), (4), (5), (6),















d ” ” 0, B B
d
d ” .
The constraints are the feasibility constraints with respect to people (1), land (4), labor
(5), and output (6), the definition of leisure (3), and the commuting equilibrium condition
[see (7)].
9





















The marginal rate of substitution between housing and consumption should be equalized
among residents of region f and, furthermore, equal to the marginal productivity of land.
An efficient allocation of workers also requires















d + - = + + - .
The marginal net costs of mobile workers in terms of the private good should be equal-
ized across regions. Note that there is no hint on equalized marginal products of labor.
Since utility was assumed to be weakly separable between, on the one hand,
leisure and, on the other hand, consumption and housing, and since the marginal rates of
                                               
9  A possible corner solution, i.e., that all individuals work in region d, is neglected here.- 11 -
substitution between consumption and housing are equalized across individuals, an ex-
plicit comparison between the marginal products of labor is possible. Commuters will
only be put on an equal footing with non-commuters if they consume more of the private
good and also more housing than non-commuters. Hence, by the efficiency condition
(29), it becomes clear that, taking traveling costs into account, commuters have to be
more productive at the margin than non-commuters:  f X L f L
d
L
f - > . Otherwise, too
much individuals would commute.
In a decentralized economy, households and firms will make an efficient use of
























= = = .
Making use of these equilibrium conditions and bringing together the budget con-
straints of non-commuting and commuting individuals, one obtains



















f + - - + + - = - - t q .
Obviously, efficiency calls for a zero RHS. Taking the higher productivity of commuters
at an efficient allocation into account, i.e.,
(32) ( ) f X












the RHS is equal to zero only if the subsidy rate q exceeds the tax rate t.
10
Summarizing:
Proposition 2: If all people live in one and the same region, an efficient commuting
equilibrium requires
                                               
10  A subsidy being higher than the tax rate guarantees that the commuters’ income net of wages and
traveling expenses is higher than the non-commuters’ income net of wages:






















The proposition states that traveling expenses should be deductible at more than one
hundred percent: b >1. The choice of the region of work would not be distorted by a
hundred-percent deductibility of traveling expenses if commuting were not time con-
suming. However, commuting usually takes a considerable amount of time, and thus a
hundred-percent deductibility is insufficient to ensure neutrality with respect to the
choice of the location of work.
V.  Household and worker mobility
Ignore now all restrictions put on the locations of production and residence. Individuals
can live and work in either region.
However, resources would be wasted if some individuals were commuting from
region d to f and simultaneously others were commuting the other way round. This can












f , where 
~
Nd
f > 0 and
~
Nf
d > 0, is an optimum population distribution. Consider a change in the population
distribution such that the number of commuters in either direction is reduced by one, and
such that the number of non-commuters in regions d and f is increased by one each, i.e.,
D D N N d
f
f
d = = -1 and  D D N N d
d
f
f = =1. Hence, the residential populations of region d
as well as of region f remain unaltered. Although output is also unaltered, less resources
(and less time) are used for traveling purposes. Everybody could be made better off, even
if everybody gets the same acres of land as before. This contradicts the assumption that
the original population distribution was optimal. Hence, w.l.o.g. in the remaining part of
the section Nd
f ” 0 is assumed.
Furthermore, if households were perfectly mobile, i.e., if a = 0, and if the produc-
tion technologies were the same in both regions, an efficient allocation can be easily
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f
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d = = 0,  N N N f
f
d
d = - , L N L
d
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d
f




















= ,   i = d, f.
No one should commute, the population-land ratios (and the labor-land ratios) should be
equalized across regions, in either region production should take place, and in each
region the marginal rate of substitution between housing and consumption should be
equal to the marginal product of land. Output and housing per capita would be the same
in both regions.
Commuting might only be efficient if two conditions are fulfilled. First, individu-
als are attached to home. Second, regions are asymmetric. With attachment to home,
equal subutilities  $ Ud and  $ Uf  (implied by the same per-capita quantities of consumption,
housing and leisure) are compatible with the migration equilibrium condition (9) only if
the sizes of residential population are also equalized. The solution to the allocation
problem when individuals are perfectly mobile is not within reach with the attachment to
home and asymmetric regions. Equalized population-land ratios together with the same
per-capita quantities of consumption and housing in both regions are no longer possible
if one region is larger than the other.
Efficient allocations are solutions of
(35) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Max U C F H U C F H U C F H
C H C H C H
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, , , , , ,
, , , , , , 1- - + + d d d d
s.t. (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (9),  Nd
f ” 0.
df
d  and df
f  are the weights of commuting and non-commuting residents of region f in the
social welfare function where 0 1 £ £ df
d  and 0 1 £ £ df
f . The constraints are the feasibil-
ity constraints concerning people (1), land (4), labor (5), and output (6), the definition of
leisure (3), the commuting equilibrium condition (7), and the migration equilibrium
condition (9).- 14 -





f . The mar-
ginal rate of substitution between housing and consumption and the marginal product of
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Additionally, taking into consideration the whole range of feasible values of df
d  and df
f ,
one obtains from the first-order conditions that the difference of marginal net costs of
mobile households working in region d in terms of the private good should be within a
certain range:
(37) ( ) 2 2 a
N
U
C X f H C f H a































‡ + + - + ‡ -
+
.
Furthermore, an efficient allocation of residents of region f requires that the
marginal net costs of residents of region f in terms of the private good should be equal-
ized, i.e., (29) has to hold. Finally, commuters have to be more productive at the margin
than non-commuters: f X L f L
d
L
f - >  [see previous section].
At the equilibrium, (25) and (31) have to be fulfilled simultaneously.
11 Hence,
concerning efficiency, the following proposition can be immediately stated.
Proposition 3: If people live in both regions and if some residents of region f commute,
an efficient commuting and migration equilibrium requires


















Since the subsidy rate q should exceed the tax rate t, traveling expenses should be de-
ductible at more than hundred percent:  b >1. However, the subsidy rate is also con-
                                               
11  From f X L f L
d
L
f - >  follows that at an efficient equilibrium the real wage rate in region d exceeds the
real wage rate in region f. Hence, it is guaranteed that residents of region d are not tempted to com-
mute, i.e., that Nd
f = 0.- 15 -
strained from above. It can be easily seen that this constraint would be violated if the
attachment parameter a were sufficiently close to zero. Hence, asymmetry and strong
attachment to home are required to allow for simultaneous household and worker mobil-
ity.
Note that the set of efficient allocations and the set of equilibria do not coincide.
If the government can only freely vary the tax rate and the subsidy rate, it is unable to
achieve allocations at which the marginal net costs of non-commuting residents of region
d are larger than (or roughly the same as) the marginal net costs of commuters from f to
d. This can be easily explained. In a decentralized economy, the marginal net costs of
mobile households are equal to the income net of taxes (divided by p) plus tax deduc-
tions (if adequate). Since commuters from f to d and non-commuting residents of d earn
the same income net of taxes, the marginal net cost of non-commuting residents of d
could be larger than the marginal net costs of mobile commuters only if tax deductions
were negative. This would be, however, incompatible with equal marginal net costs of
non-commuting and commuting residents of region f.
In order to make the whole range of efficient allocations available, the govern-
ment has to have access to an additional policy instrument.
VI.  Household and worker mobility and tax rate differences
To enable the government to discriminate against the residents of region f, the wage tax
should be levied at different rates according to the residence principle. If the tax rate in
region i is denoted by  ti , the budget constraint of non-commuting and commuting resi-
dents of region i become











i i i = + -
- 1 t

















respectively. Instead of (31),



















f + - - + + - = - - t q- 16 -
is fulfilled at the equilibrium. Recall that efficiency requires the RHS to be zero. Fur-
thermore, the difference of marginal net costs of workers in region d is given by













d + + - + = - - q t t .
Hence, the following proposition can be derived
Proposition 4: If people live in both regions and if some residents of region f commute
and if the government is able to levy the wage tax at different rates according to the














   and    ( ) 2 2 a
N
U
f f L a























‡ - ‡ -
+
t t .
If the tax rate in region f is larger than the tax rate in region d, allocations that are not
available without discriminating taxation are within reach. Tax rate differences make it
possible that the marginal net costs of non-commuting residents of region d are larger
than the marginal net costs of commuters from f to d. The whole range of efficient allo-
cations is available.
VII.  Concluding remarks
The basic question of the paper was whether or not traveling expenses to work should be
deductible from the income tax base. In order to answer this question, a simple two-
regions model of (im-) perfect household and worker mobility has been employed. The
analysis focused on the efficient allocation of land, labor and residents. The following
main results were derived.
First, deductibility of traveling expenses to work is clearly inefficient only if
households are perfectly mobile with respect to their place of residence and if, in addi-
tion, households cannot choose the place of work, i.e., if there is not an equally good
place of work.
Second, if, at the optimum, households are indifferent between various regions of
work, traveling expenses have to be deductible from the wage tax base at more than one- 17 -
hundred percent. This holds true even if households choose simultaneously the place of
work and the region of residence.
Third, in the presence of imperfect household mobility, a uniform tax rate and a
subsidy rate are insufficient instruments for making the whole set of efficient allocations
available. If, however, the government levied the wage tax according to the residence
principle and if tax rate differences were possible, the entire range of efficient allocations
would be within reach. The discussion has shown that non-uniform tax rates or similar
instruments are necessary to enable the government to achieve the more extreme subsets
of efficient allocations. This points to a positive role of decentralization.
Although the discussion has been embodied in a general equilibrium framework,
the analysis has obviously some important shortcomings. One is the limitation to the
first-best analysis. By fixing the working hours per person, a second-best-taxation prob-
lem has been avoided. Naturally, results become more vague in a second-best situation.
The second weakness of the approach is the already mentioned lack of a transportation
cost in the model. If the transport of final goods caused considerable costs, commuting
would be less efficient since, to a larger extent, production should take place where
consumers live. However, in a multi-good model the desirability of commuting could be
restored. Another weak point of the analysis is that any compliance and administration
costs of a relief for traveling expenses to work have been neglected. Finally, a possible
inverse relationship between the expenses to work and the traveling time has not been
discussed here [see Wrede (1999)].- 18 -
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